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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Reggie "Jordan" Larsen contends the district court made two different errors in this case.
First, it erred by allowing the State to amend the charging document at trial to allege a new
charge of which Mr. Larsen did not have fair notice. As such, this Court should vacate the
resulting conviction and remand this case for further proceedings.
Second, it acted unreasonably when it imposed his sentence because it based its decision,
in part, on a misreading of the presentence report (PSI). Specifically, the district court said the
PSI recommended incarceration when, in fact, the PSI made no specific recommendation in that
regard.

In fact, the only specific recommendations in the presentence materials actually

recommended community-based treatment.

As such, this Court should at least vacate

Mr. Larsen's sentence and remand this case for a new sentencing hearing.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The complaint Mr. Larsen received in this case alleged that he had committed lewd
conduct by manual-to-genital contact. (R., pp.3-4.) While the complaint did not identify the
specific facts in that regard, the affidavit of probable cause filed in support of that charge recited
allegations made by the alleged victim, A.L., during a CARES interview. (Compare R., p.4 with
R., pp.5-6.) The only lewd act she reported during that interview was that Mr. Larsen allegedly
rubbed his hand on her vagina. 1 (See R., p.5.)

1

A.L. alleged additional touching, such as Mr. Larsen rubbing her breasts or tapping her
buttocks with his penis, which did not amount to "lewd conduct." (See R., pp.5-6; Tr., p.872,
L.24 - p.874, L.9 (the prosecutor conceding the district court should grant Mr. Larsen's motion to
amend the jury instructions to prevent a fatal variance in that regard); Tr., p.802. Ls.9-13 (the
prosecutor moving to dismiss an allegation of anal-genital contact due to lack of evidence).)

1

Based on that information, Mr. Larsen waived his right to a preliminary hearing and the
case proceeded to trial. (See R., p.33.) Mr. Larsen requested the district court instruct the jurors,

inter alia, that, if a person is asleep or unconscious when the act in question is committed, they
are to find the defendant not guilty because of a lack of intent. (R., pp.92, 102.) One part of
Mr. Larsen's ultimate explanation for the conduct AL. discussed in the CARES interview was
that he had accidentally touched her while asleep or while in the process of waking up. (See,

e.g., R., p.6.)
However, in opening arguments, the prosecutor asserted that the jury would also hear that
Mr. Larsen allegedly grabbed A.L's hand and made her touch his penis. (Tr., p.277, Ls.2-5.)
AL. did, indeed, testify to that conduct in addition to the conduct she had mentioned in the
CARES interview.

(Tr., p.393, L.21 - p.394, L.1, p.422, L.10 - p.423, L.15; see generally

Tr., pp.371-423.) She asserted that she had mentioned that particular conduct during her CARES
interview, but both the CARES interviewers contradicted her in that respect.

( Compare

Tr., p.423, L.23 - p.424, L.12; with Tr., p.551, L.14 - p.552, L.5 (the forensic interviewer also
admitting she asked her questions in such a way that could have led AL. to make such a
disclosure); and Tr., p.779, Ls.10-14.) In fact, the only other references in the appellate record to
that sort of conduct were two third-hand, hearsay assertions by AL.' s brother and father which
were apparently made prior to A.L's CARES interview. (See Con£ Exh., pp.101, 109, 129; see

generally R., Con£ Exh.; but see Tr., p.551, Ls.14-18 (the forensic interviewer testifying no one
ever suggested to her that such an act had occurred).)2

2

Citations to "Conf. Exh." refer to the electronic file "Confidential Exhibits Appeal," which
contains the materials collected as part of the presentence process, including the police reports.
There is nothing in the record which suggests that the district court was aware of the police
reports at the time of the trial.
2

At the end of his case-in-chief, but before formally resting his case, the prosecutor moved
to amend the information to include an allegation of "genital-to-manual" contact, so as to argue
the hand-on-penis incident alongside the rubbing-the-vagina incident as bases for conviction
without confusing the jury. (Tr., p.802, L.9 - p.803, L.15.) However, the prosecutor asserted
that Mr. Larsen had sufficient notice by the fact that the charging document contained the
"manual-genital" language. (Tr., p.802, Ls.15-17.) Mr. Larsen objected, asserting he did not, in
fact, have notice of the hand-on-penis allegation prior to trial.

(Tr., p.804, Ls.13-18.) The

district court granted the State's motion without discussing Mr. Larsen's notice objection.
(Tr., p.805, Ls.11-17; see generally Tr.) At the jury instruction conference, Mr. Larsen renewed
his notice objection, stating "I suppose in this case that or they [the jurors] could find that
Mr. Larsen mad [A.L.] touch his penis, and that would be -- that would constitute a lewd act,
even though, you known, we weren't on -- we were not on notice of that based on the
discovery." (Tr., p.868, Ls.20-25.) The district court did not address that renewed objection and
instructed the jury consistent with the amended information. (See R., p.123; see generally Tr.)
The jury ultimately found Mr. Larsen guilty as charged. 3 (R., p.146.)
The ensuing PSI ultimately did not offer a recommendation as to prison versus probation,
explaining: "Based on the defendant's assessed risks, needs and protective factors, in addition to
the fact his psycho-sexual evaluation has not been received, I believe Reggie Larsen's sentencing
is best determined by the wisdom of the court." (Con£ Exh., p.18.) However, the PSI provided
3

Defense counsel had initially requested a special verdict form as part of an objection to the
elements instruction based on the fact that it included the language "or any other lewd or
lascivious act" in addition to the alleged manual-genital and genital-manual contact, (See
generally Tr., p.861, L.19 - p.868, L.20.) However, he withdrew the request for a special verdict
form when the district court struck the "any other lewd act" language from the instruction. (See
Tr., p.874, Ls.4-9.) As a result, the verdict form does not provide any additional insight as to
which act on which specific act the jury convicted Mr. Larsen. (See R., p.146; R., p.126 (the
unanimity instruction given to the jury in this regard).)
3

information showing half the people with similar LSI scores (21 - moderate risk) to Mr. Larsen
or with offenses and criminal histories (first felony offense) have received suspended sentences
or periods of retained jurisdiction.

(Con£ Exh., pp.16-17, 31.)

Additionally, the GAIN-I

evaluation recommended "Level 1 Outpatient Treatment." (Con£ Exh., p.26; compare Con£
Exh., p.16 (the PSI reporting that the GAIN evaluation recommended Level 2 Intensive
Outpatient programming).) The psycho sexual evaluation (PSE) also expressly recommended "it
would be "best with beginning sex offender treatment in a community setting" because
Mr. Larsen presented only a Low Risk for reoffending. (Con£ Exh., p.178.) The PSE author
also gave specific recommendations regarding supervision of Mr. Larsen in the community.
(Con£ Exh., pp.177-80.)
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel recommended the district court suspend
Mr. Larsen's sentence for a period of probation, or alternatively, a period ofretainedjurisdiction,
with a long underlying sentence. (Tr., p.1091, Ls.1-14.) The district court's first observation in
discussing the sentence it was imposing was:

"The presentence investigation report, which

recommends the Court impose a period of incarceration, all the attachments to the presentence
report, and they're extensive." (Tr., p.1103, Ls.13-15.) The district court proceeded to impose
and execute a unified sentence of sixteen years, with three and one-half years fixed. (Tr., p.1111,
Ls.8-18, p.1116, Ls.15-16.)

Mr. Larsen filed a notice of appeal timely from the ensuing

judgment of conviction. (R., pp.162, 167.)

4

ISSUES
I.

Whether the district court's decision to allow the State to amend the Information during
trial infringed on Mr. Larsen's substantial rights of due process and to prepare and
present a defense.

II.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by basing its sentencing decision on a
clearly-erroneous understanding of the presentence materials.

5

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court's Decision To Allow The State To Amend The Information During Trial
Infringed On Mr. Larsen's Substantial Rights Of Due Process And To Prepare And Present A
Defense
A.

Standard Of Review
The district court's decision to grant a motion to amend the information is reviewed for

an abuse of discretion. State v. Jeske, 164 Idaho 862, 870 (2019). The district court abuses its
discretion when: (1) it fails to recognize the issue as one of discretion; (2) it acts beyond the
outer bounds of its discretion; (3) it acts inconsistently with the applicable legal standards, or
(4) it reaches its decision without exercising reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856,
863-64 (2018).
A district court may allow an amendment to the information any time prior to the State
resting its case, so long as doing so does not prejudice the defendant's substantial rights. Jeske,
164 Idaho at 870; I.C.R. 7(e). This is true even if the amendment merely alleges additional
means by which the defendant may have committed the alleged crime. Jeske, 164 Idaho at 870.

B.

The District Court Erred By Not Ruling On Mr. Larsen's Notice Objection To The
Motion To Amend The Information Mid-Trial
As the Idaho Supreme Court has explained, when the district court makes a discretionary

decision without addressing a legal question raised in connection with that decision, the appellate
court should simply remand the case for the district court to consider the question in the first
instance. Montgomery v. Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1, 6-7 (2009). Basically, the ruling on the
legal question can affect how the trial court weighs the relevant factors in making the ensuing
discretionary decision. See id. Because the same sort of error occurred in this case - since the

6

trial court did not rule on the question of notice before granting the decision to amend the
information - this case should be remanded for the district court properly make the discretionary
ruling after resolving the outstanding legal question of notice.

C.

Allowing The Mid-Trial Amendment Was Improper Because It Impacted Mr. Larsen's
Substantial Rights To Due Process And To Prepare And Present A Defense
One of the ways a defendant's substantial rights can be violated by a motion to add a new

theory of means of commission is if the defendant did not have fair notice of the facts underlying
the new theory. State v. Tapia, 127 Idaho 249, 253 (Ct. App. 1995). To provide that notice, the
charging document "must set forth a concise statement of the facts constituting the alleged
offense" that is sufficient to alert the defendant to what allegations he must defend against.

State v. Dorsey, 139 Idaho 149, 151 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Owen, 129 Idaho 920, 926
(Ct. App. 1997).
When an offense can be committed by a multitude of methods, "mere repetition of the
statutory language may not be sufficient to satisfy the pleading instrument function of notifying
the defendant of the charge which must be defended against."

Dorsey, 139 Idaho at 151

(emphasis from original). Lewd conduct is one such offense. See I.C. § 18-1508 (listing several
different types of contact that amount to lewd conduct). In such cases, an actual description of
the facts underlying the charge is required to give sufficient notice to the defendant. Dorsey, 139
Idaho at 151 (noting this rule also applies to manslaughter and theft). However, when such
information is missing in the charging document itself, the due process requirement may still be
satisfied if the other information presented by the State in support of the charging document
reveals the underlying facts. Owen, 129 Idaho at 927-28 (finding no due process violation even
though the charging document was not sufficiently specific because the information presented by
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the State at the preliminary hearings sufficiently identified the means or manner by which the
defendant was alleged to have committed the charged offense); see also Jeske, 164 Idaho at 871
(holding there was no notice violation where the defendant knew of the relevant facts and the
State's proposed jury instructions indicated its intent to prosecute based on those facts).
The lack of notice in that context is evident, for example, in State v. Colwell, 124 Idaho
560 (Ct. App. 1993). In that case, the Information charged a single count oflewd conduct based
on a specific act of sexual intercourse with the victim. Id. at 563. However, there were other
alleged acts in that case which might have also constituted lewd conduct, including an allegation
that the defendant had taken the victim's hand and tried to place it on his penis, about which
State still presented evidence about them at trial. 4 Id. at 563, 566. Unfortunately, the jury
instructions in Colwell were overbroad and allowed the jury to convict based on those other acts,
not just the conduct specifically alleged in the Information. Id. at 564-65.
The Court of Appeals held this variance was fatal because it amounted to a constructive
amendment because it added allegations of crimes which were separate and distinct from the
charged conduct. Id. at 566. Alternatively, the Colwell Court explained, it would have found the
variance fatal because it "prejudiced Colwell's right to fair notice of the charges which he was to
defend against." Id. Specifically, it held: "While it is evident that Colwell was aware the state
would introduce evidence of the additional acts, we find nothing in the record to indicate that the
state ever intended to prosecute him for any crime or crimes for which these acts constituted an
essential element." Id. Thus, the violation in this regard was that Mr. Colwell did not have
4

In Colwell, the other acts occurred on different days from the charged conduct. See Colwell,
124 Idaho at 563. However, that fact is of little relevance with respect to Mr. Larsen's case,
since the prosecutor in this case asserted each act AL. described could be charged as a separate
and distinct event. (See Tr., p.862, Ls.2-7 (the prosecutor asserting he could file a separate
charge against Mr. Larsen related to the allegation he rubbed AL.' s breasts regardless of the
outcome of this trial).)
8

"notice that the state intended to prosecute him and obtain a conviction for these additional acts."
Id. at 567.

The same lack of notice is apparent in Mr. Larsen's case. In fact, it is more evident here
than in Colwell because there was not even sufficient notice of the facts underlying the allegation
themselves. The charging document in this case recites the statutory language of "manual to
genital" contact, but does not include any specific allegations of the facts identifying how that
contact occurred. (See R., pp.3-4, 41-42.) The only information the State presented in support of
that charging document was in the affidavit of probable cause. (See R., pp.5-6; see also R., p.33
(noting that Mr. Larsen waived his right to a preliminary hearing).) That affidavit only identified
the allegations A.L made during her CARES interview as the basis for the charge; she gave no
indication that there was an allegation that Mr. Larsen had made A.L touch his penis. Compare,
e.g., Owen, 129 Idaho at 927-28 (where the relevant facts were presented at the preliminary

hearing).
In fact, the only scant references to that conduct that appear anywhere in this record were
third-hand, hearsay assertions made prior to A.L's CARES interview by A.L's brother and
father. (Con£ Exh., pp.101, 109, 129.) However, those third-hand, hearsay allegations were not
sufficient to satisfy the notice requirements because A.L did not endorse those allegations
during her ensuing CARES interview. (See generally Con£ Exh., pp.109-11; cf Tr., p.551, L14
- p.552, L5, Tr., p.779, Ls.10-14 (the CARES interviewers confirming that fact in their trial
testimony).)

As such, Mr. Larsen, like Mr. Colwell, did not have sufficient notice of the

allegation of an alternative means of committing the alleged offense. Therefore, allowing the
amendment to the information in the middle of trial violated his substantial rights.
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In evaluating whether fair notice was given, the appellate courts have also looked at
whether the amendment impacted the defendant's ability to meaningfully present his defense.

See, e.g., State v. Tapia , 127 Idaho 249, 253 (1995). Such an evaluation in this case only
reaffirms the error in allowing the amendment.

Since A.L. did not endorse the third-hand,

hearsay allegations, the only possible factual basis for the lewd conduct prosecution was her
assertion that Mr. Larsen had rubbed her vagina.

(See R., pp.5-6.)

One major aspect of

Mr. Larsen's defense to that particular allegation was that he was asleep or unconscious when
that particular alleged touching occurred, and so, could not have acted with the requisite intent.

(See, e.g., R., pp.5-6; R., pp. 92, 102 (defense counsel requesting an instruction that, if the jury
found he was asleep or unconsciousness at the time of the touching, they should find him not
guilty).) However, the new allegation that Mr. Larsen grabbed A.L. 's hand and used it force her
to touch his penis falls well outside the scope of that defense because that sort of conduct
inherently requires conscious action on his part.
Therefore, as a result of the amendment to allow the jury to convict Mr. Larsen on that
new theory of means, he was forced to alter his defense mid-trial - leaving the unconsciousness
defense behind by-and-large, and turning his focus instead to "target fixation or cognitive bias"
on the part of the investigators.

(See generally Tr., pp.961-83 (defense counsel's closing

arguments); compare Tr., pp.213-16 (defense counsel asking the jurors in voir dire about people
doing things while asleep) with Tr., p.969, Ls.5-8 (defense counsel's closing argument regarding
unconscious actions).).

As such, the record shows that allowing the amendment impacted

Mr. Larsen's ability to prepare and present his defense.

Compare Tapia, 127 Idaho at 253

(finding no error in allowing the amendment because there was no showing that the amendment
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compromised the alibi defense being offered by the defendant in that case since his alibi
evidence extended to the newly-alleged acts as well as the originally-alleged acts).
Further demonstrating the impact on Mr. Larsen's ability to present a defense, the
prosecutor did not make his motion to add this new theory of means at the time A.L. included it
in her testimony, or even at the start of trial, when he obviously anticipated making it an issue.
(See Tr., p.277, Ls.2-5.)

Rather, he waited until after the CARES interviewers and the

investigating officer had also testified to do so. (See generally Tr., p.802, L.9 - p.803, L. 18.)
That means, at the time Mr. Larsen was forced to change his defense strategy, the witnesses
relevant to that new defense to be released from their subpoenas. (See Tr., p.578, Ls.4-17, p.800,
Ls.17-23.) Therefore, his ability to explore the nature of that defense with them was further
hampered by the timing of the prosecutor's motion.
Since allowing the amendment to add a new theory of means violated Mr. Larsen's
substantial rights, the district court's decision to allow that amendment was improper. Therefore,
this Court should vacate his conviction and remand this case for further proceedings.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Basing Its Sentencing Decision On A ClearlyErroneous Understanding Of The Presentence Materials
A.

Standard Of Review
The district court's sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v.

Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 567 (Ct. App. 1982). The district court abuses its discretion when: (1) it
fails to recognize the issue as one of discretion; (2) it acts beyond the outer bounds of its
discretion; (3) it acts inconsistently with the applicable legal standards, or (4) it reaches its
decision without exercising reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863-64 (2018).
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B.

The District Court Made Its Sentencing Decision In An Unreasonable Manner Because
That Decision Was Based On A Clearly-Erroneous Reading Of The Presentence
Materials' Recommendation As To The Question Of Prison Versus Probation
The first thing the district court observed with respect to Mr. Larsen's case as it

announced its sentencing decision was that it had considered "[t ]he presentence investigation
report, which recommends the Court impose a period of incarceration . . . ." (Tr., p.1103,
Ls.13-15.) That assertion is disproved by the record. The PSI made no recommendations as to
prison versus probation at all.

(See generally Conf. Exh., pp.1-19.)

Rather, what the PSI

actually said was: "Based on the defendant's assessed risks, needs and protective factors, in
addition to the fact his psycho-sexual evaluation has not been received, I believe Reggie Larsen's
sentencing is best determined by the wisdom of the court." (Con£ Exh., p.18.) As such, the
district court's understanding of the PSI was clearly erroneous.
In fact, the information the PSI author did have showed that more than half the people
who had a similar LSI-R score to Mr. Larsen (21 - moderate risk) received a period of probation
or retained jurisdiction. (Con£ Exh., pp.16-17.) Likewise, the sentencing database inquiry of
people convicted of the same offense with a similar criminal history (no prior felonies) revealed
three of the six received periods of retained jurisdiction. (Con£ Exh., p.31.) In fact, the PSI
author acknowledged that the GAIN-I evaluation was recommending outpatient treatment for
Mr. Larsen.

(Compare Conf. Exh., p.26 (the GAIN evaluation recommending Level 1

Outpatient treatment); with Conf. Exh., p.16 (the PSI author reporting the GAIN evaluation
recommended Level 2 Intensive Outpatient programming).)
Moreover, the PSE report actually gave a recommendation for a period of probation,
explaining that, because Mr. Larsen only presented a Low Risk for reoffending, it would be "best
with beginning sex offender treatment in a community setting." (Con£ Exh., p.178.) The PSE
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author also offered extensive advice for how to effectively supervise Mr. Larsen in the
community. (Con£ Exh., pp.177-80.) Thus, the district court's clearly-erroneous understanding
of the PSI means it was actually acting contrary to the information contained in the rest of the
presentence materials.
The result of the district court's clearly-erroneous conclusion is that it did not reach its
decision to execute Mr. Larsen's sentence (rather than place him on probation or retain
jurisdiction over his case) in an exercise of reason. That fundamental misunderstanding of the
information provided in the presentence materials means that the district court imposed a
sentence without a proper understanding of how best to serve the four goals of sentencing in
Mr. Larsen's case, particularly in terms of protection of society and rehabilitation. See State v.
Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993) (explaining protection of society is the primary goal the

district court should consider); State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971) (explaining that
rehabilitation should usually be the first means by which the district court attempts to achieve the
goal of protection of society), superseded on other grounds as stated in State v. Theil, 158 Idaho
103 (2015). Therefore, the district court abused its discretion when it imposed Mr. Larsen's
sentence with that fundamental misunderstanding of the presentence materials.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Larsen respectfully requests this Court vacate his conviction and the jury verdict and
remand this case for further proceedings.

Alternatively, he respectfully requests this Court

vacate his sentence and remand his case for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 27 th day of March, 2020.

Isl Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27 th day of March, 2020, I caused a true and correct
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KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

Isl Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
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